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ARGUMENTS
I.

BOTH ESTABLISHED UTAH CASE LAW AND THE RECORD
ON APPEAL DEMONSTRATE THAT TRIAL COUNSELS
FAILURE TO REQUEST JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
LESSER
INCLUDED
OFFENSES
CONSTITUTED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

The State argues that "defense counsel's decision to forego
lesser

included

offense

instructions

did

not

constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel where such instructions would
have been inconsistent with Defendant's all-or-nothing defense at
trial."

See Brief of Appellee, pp. 11, 14-18.

The record on

appeal, Utah case law, and the applicable statutory provisions,
demonstrate quite the contrary.
As part of its argument, the State, without authority for
such a proposition, implies that a defendant must marshal the
evidence in support of the lesser included offense instruction.
See Brief of Appellee, pp. 12-14.

No such requirement applies to

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that are premised upon
trial counsel's failure to request a lesser included offense jury
instruction.

Moreover, the State's argument is in direct conflict

with the correction-of-error standard of review applied to claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.

See State

v. Clark,

2004 UT

25, %6, 89 P.3d 162 (stating that " [a]n ineffective assistance of
counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a

1

question of law"); 1 State v.

Maestas,

1999 UT 32, f20, 984 P.2d

376 (stating that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal are reviewed "as a matter of law"). 2
In the instant case, there was no reasonable basis for not
requesting lesser included offense jury instructions.

Rather, as

demonstrated below, Mr. Terry had everything to lose and nothing
to gain by precluding the jury from exercising the option to
convict on lesser included offenses.

Contrary to the State's

argument, the record demonstrates that trial counsel did anything
but consciously consider the possibility of instructing the jury
concerning the lesser included offenses.

At no time during the

review of the proposed jury instructions did trial counsel either
object or explain his strategical

reasons

for not

requesting

lesser included offense jury instructions (R. 601:62-77) . This is
not a case like State

v.

Litherland,

2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92, where

the failure to object involved "more art than science."
1|21.

Rather, the decision not to request

Id.

a particular

at
jury

'Both State v. Clark,
2004 UT 25, %6, 89 P.3d 162 and the
applicable standard of review are cited by the State in its Brief.
See Brief of Appellee, pp. 1-2.
2

The State's argument is also inconsistent with the rules to be
applied in cases such as this, namely, that the facts be viewed in a
light most favorable to the defendant, and that "the requirements .
. for the inclusion of a lesser included offense instruction
requested by the defendant should be liberally construed." See
State
v. Velarde,
734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986); State v. Spillers,
2005 UT
App 283, 1(13; and State v. Hansen,
734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986).
2

instruction

concerning

a

lesser

included

offense

involves

objective factors and questions of law.
The jury must be instructed concerning a lesser included
offense

if

(1) the

statutory elements of greater

included offenses overlap to some degree, and

and

lesser

(2) the evidence

provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant
of

the

offense

offense."

See

charged
State

and

convicting

v. Baker,

him

671 P.2d

also

2002 UT 106, H23, 61 P.3d 1019; State v. Evans,
888; State v. Hansen,

the

152, 159

(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)); see

20 P.3d

of

included

(Utah 1983)

State

v.

Kell,

2001 UT 22, fl8,

734 P.2d 421, 424

(Utah 1986).

Contrary to the State's argument, the court, in the course of
making this determination, must view the facts in a light most
favorable to the defendant.

State

(Utah 1986); see

v.

Most

importantly,

also

State

perhaps,

v.

Spillers,

"the

Velarde,

734 P.2d 449, 453

2005 UT App 283, fl3.

requirements

.

.

. for

the

inclusion of a lesser included offense instruction requested by
the defendant should be liberally construed."

Hansen,

734 P.2d at

424.
The elements of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory
precursors and/or equipment, the crime with which Mr. Terry was

3

charged and convicted, are contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-3 7d4(1) (a) and 58-37d-5(l) (a),3 which state as follows:
It is unlawful for any person to
knowingly or intentionally . . . possess a
controlled
substance precursor with the
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
A person who violates Subsection 58-37d4(1) (a) . . . is guilty of a first degree
felony if the trier of fact also finds any
one of the following conditions occurred in
conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm; . . . .
(e) conspire with or aid another to
engage in a clandestine
laboratory
operation . . . .4
The elements of possession of a controlled substance precursor are
alternatively set forth at Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37c-3(12) (k) , 5837c-19(2), and 58-37c-20 (1) ,5 which state:
"Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section
58-1-501 includes knowingly and intentionally
. . . obtaining or attempting to obtain or to
possess any controlled substance precursor or
any combination of controlled
substance
precursors knowing or having a reasonable
cause
to
believe
that
the
controlled
substance precursor is intended to be used in

3

A copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 (2002) and 58-37d-5 (2002)
is attached to the previously filed Brief of Appellant as Addendum D.
4

Without the possession-of-a-firearm condition, the charge of
possession of a controlled substance precursor is a second-degree
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(2) (2002).
5

A copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37c-3(12) (2002), 58-37c-19
(2002), and 58-37c-20 (2002) is attached to the previously filed
Brief of Appellant as Addendum E.
4

the unlawful manufacture of any controlled
substance.6
•

*

*

*

Any person who is not licensed to engage
in regulated transactions and not excepted
from licensure is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor who, under circumstances not
amounting to a violation of Subsection 5837c-3(12)(k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(1)(a):
(a)
(b)

ie

ic

ic

possesses more than two ounces of
crystal iodine; or
offers
to
sell,
sells,
or
distributes
crystal
iodine
to
another.

*

Any person who is not licensed to engage
in regulated transactions and not excepted
from licensure who, under circumstances not
amounting to a violation of Subsection 5837c-3 (12) (k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(1) (a),
possesses more than 12 grams of ephedrine or
pseudoephedrine, their salts, isomers, or
salts of isomers, or a combination of any of
these substances, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
According

to

established

Utah

case

law,

an

offense

is

included in a greater offense when there is "some relationship"
between them and "some overlap" in the proof that is required to
establish the elements of both offenses.
P.2d 117, 116 (Utah 1986) (citing State
1983)).

See State

v. Hill,

v. Pitts,

728

674 P.2d 96 (Utah

Not only is there is a close relationship between the

6

A violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(12)(k) is a seconddegree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-ll(2) (2002).
5

enhanced

crime

of

clandestine

laboratory

precursors

and/or

equipment and possession of controlled substance precursors in the
instant

case, but

there

also

is

significant

overlap

in the

elements of each offense.
Notwithstanding

the

State's

assertions,

the

evidence

presented during trial provided a rational basis for the jury to
acquit Mr. Terry of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory
precursors and/or equipment and then convict him of a lesser
included offense of possession of a controlled substance precursor
had those particular instructions been given
601:82-92; R. 601:115-30).

(R. 601:24-35; R.

Based upon the facts before it, the

jury could have rationally found that Mr. Terry, at best, merely
possessed the controlled substance precursors of iodine and/or
pseudoephedrine (See id.).

Cf.

State

v. Hopkins,

1999 UT 98, %21 f

989 P.2d 1065.
Further,

trial

counsel

made

no

attempt,

whatsoever,

to

request a jury instruction concerning the attempt of Mr. Terry to
commit the crime of either the enhanced crime of clandestine
laboratory
controlled

precursors

and/or

equipment

substance precursors.7

7

Utah

and

possession

law dictates

that

of
"a

In its Brief, the State made no attempt to rebut Mr. Terry's
lesser included offense analysis.
Consequently, for purposes of
argument, the lesser included offenses set forth in both the Brief of
Appellant and this Reply Brief are established.
6

person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of
the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense."
101(1)

(2002).

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-

The facts of the instant

case establish the

necessary and appropriate circumstances that would have allowed
the jury to rationally find that Mr. Terry's alleged solicitation
of Mr. Archibald to purchase the controlled substance precursors
actually constituted an attempt.8
The failures of trial counsel to request jury instructions on
the lesser included offenses of possession of controlled substance
precursors and the attempt to commit the alleged crimes fell below
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light
of existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §§
76-1-402(3) and (4), Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, and the underlying
factual circumstances of this case.

But for counsel's deficient

performance

a lesser

of

failing

to

request

included

instruction, Mr. Terry would not have been convicted
enhanced

crime

of

clandestine

laboratory

precursors

offense
of the
and/or

equipment.

8

A criminal attempt to commit a crime results in a one-step
reduction of the charged crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(2) and
(5) (2002) .
7

The State also argues that plain error does not apply to the
instant case because the trial court has no independent duty to
give a lesser included offense instruction if it is not requested.
See

Brief

of

Appellee,

p.

18.

However,

this

is

directly

contradicted by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (2002), which states
that the trial court is not "obligated to charge the jury with
respect to an included offense unless

there is a rational basis

for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense." (Emphasis added).
The instant case provides a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting

Mr. Terry of the enhanced

clandestine

laboratory

precursors

crime of possession of

and/or

equipment

and

then

convicting him of a lesser included offense of possession of a
controlled substance precursor.

The record demonstrates that Mr.

Terry was neither in actual nor constructive possession of the
controlled substance precursors (R. 601::24-35; R. 601:82-92; R.
601:115-30).

Moreover, Mr. Terry was never in possession of any

clandestine drug lab equipment (R. 601:204-18; cf.
§ 58-37d-6 (2002)) .

8

Utah Code Ann.

II.

THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT TRIAL COUNSEL
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY
FAILING TO ACCURATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY
CONCERNING THE LAW AND ELEMENTS OF THE
CHARGES APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

According to Utah law, the jury must be instructed with
respect

to all the legal elements it must

defendant of the crime so charged.
1061

(Utah

1991) .

The

State

v.

of

such

absence

reversible error as a matter of law.
618 P.2d

33, 35

(Utah 1980)).

Id.

find to convict a

Jones,
an

823 P. 2d 1059,
instruction

(citing State

v.

is

Laine,

"The general rule is that an

accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is
essential.

Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error."

State v. .Roberts, 711 P. 2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985) (citing Laine,
P.2d at 35); see

also

State

(per curiam); State

1986)
1984).

v.
v.

Harmon,
Reedy,

618

712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah

681 P.2d 1251, 1252

(Utah

"Thus, the failure to give this instruction can never be

harmless error."

A.

Jones,

Constructive

823 P.2d at 1061.

Possession

Instruction

The State argues that Mr. Terry's ineffective

assistance

challenge to the jury instruction defining constructive possession
fails because the instruction is consistent with Utah law.
Brief

of

Appellee,

pp.

2 0-22.

Although

the

See

constructive

possession jury instruction may have been consistent with Utah

9

law, the jury should not have been so instructed inasmuch as it
did not apply to the facts of the instant case.
Trial counsel denied Mr. Terry of his constitutional right to
the effective

assistance

of counsel

by

failing

to object

to

Instruction No. 33,9 which was utilized to instruct the jury about
the law of constructive possession.

Utah law dictates that to

prove constructive possession there must be a "sufficient nexus"
between the accused and the controlled substance precursors to
permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the
intent

to

exercise

dominion

substance precursors.

See State

P.2d 911 (citing State

v. Fox,

and

control

v.

Layman,

over

the

controlled

1999 UT 79, 1|l3, 985

709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)).

Hence, to establish constructive possession in the instant case,
the

State

had

to

prove

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt

that

the

controlled substance precursors "were subject to the defendant's
dominion and control and the defendant had the intent to exercise
that control."

Id.

at fl6 (citing Fox,

709 P.2d at 318).

According to the record in the instant case, no one but the
police took possession, either actual or constructive, of the
controlled substance precursors (R. 601:37-38; R. 601:129-30).

In

the instant case, the police incontestably and at all relevant

9

A true and correct copy of Jury Instruction No. 33 (R. 100) is
attached to the previously filed Brief of Appellant as Addendum F.
10

times had direct custody, dominion, and control of the controlled
substance

precursors

over

constructive possession.

which

Mr.

Terry

allegedly

had

As a matter of impossibility, the State

could not have proven that Mr. Terry constructively possessed the
controlled substance precursors.

The factual circumstances of the

instant case, at the very most, constituted either an attempted
constructive possession or an attempted conspiracy to possess the
controlled substance precursors.
The failure of trial counsel to object to Instruction No. 33
fell

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonable

professional

judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the underlying
factual circumstances of this case.10

But for counsel's deficient

performance, the outcome would have been different in that Mr.
Terry would not have been convicted of the enhanced crime of
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment.
"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the facts of the case."

See State

P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v.
(Utah 1981)). n

Potter,

v. Hamilton,

827

627 P.2d 75, 78

Based upon established principles of plain error,

the trial court committed plain error by failing to accurately
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case.
10

See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e) .

ll

See

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(a).
11

The error concerning constructive possession should have been
obvious in light of prior Utah case law and rules concerning a
trial court's duty and a defendant's right "to have his theory of
the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way."
Potter, 627 P. 2d at 78.

Further, the error that resulted was

harmful because it precluded the jury from duly and accurately
considering the law as it pertained to the underlying facts of the
case.

B,

Conspiracy

Instruction

In its Brief, the State argues that Mr. Terry's ineffective
assistance

challenge

to

the

lack

of

a

conspiracy

elements

instruction fails because he provides no evidentiary support for
his

claim.

See Brief

of Appellee, pp. 24-27.

The

State's

argument is without merit for the reasons set forth below.
To convict Mr. Terry of Clandestine Laboratory Precursors
and/or

Equipment

as

set

forth

in

Counts

I

and

II

of

the

Information, the jury had to find that the State had proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Terry "[k]nowingly or intentionally;
. . . [p]ossessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; AND/OR

. . .

[c]onspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine

12

laboratory operation . . . ." (R. 92-94) .12 According to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-201 (2002) , "a person is guilty of conspiracy when he,
intending that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of
the conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance
of the conspiracy . . . ."
Trial counsel

failed to request a jury instruction that

accurately defined the conspiracy element as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-4-201.

In addition, trial counsel

failed to

request that a special verdict form be utilized by the jury so
that Mr. Terry, as the accused, could determine which variation
the

jury

relied

upon

in

the

course

of

convicting

him

of

Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment.
In State
charged

the

operations,

v. Hopkins,
defendant
which

with

included

criteria for conviction.
verdict

1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1073, the State

Id.

form was utilized,

unlawful
multiple
at 1|2 7.

clandestine
variations

laboratory

of

statutory

However, because no special

the Court

determined

that

it was

possible that the jury relied upon the subsection that includes
all the elements for conviction of possession of a controlled
substance

precursor

as

a

lesser

12

included

offense.

Id.

A true and correct copy of Jury Instructions Nos. 28 and 29 (R.
92-94) are attached to the previously filed Brief of Appellant as
Addendum G.
13

Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction for
precursor possession.

See

id.

Contrary to the State's position, trial counsel's failure to
propose a jury instruction that accurately defined the conspiracy
element and the failure to request that a special verdict form be
utilized
reasonable

by

the

jury

professional

fell

below

judgment.

an

objective

This

is

standard

of

demonstrated

by

existing Utah case law, statutory criteria, and the underlying
factual circumstances of this case.
But for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome would
have been different inasmuch as Mr. Terry would not have been
convicted

of

the

enhanced

crime

of

clandestine

precursors and/or equipment as a first-degree

laboratory

felony.

Had a

special verdict form been requested and utilized, Mr. Terry would
have been provided with notice of the variation relied upon by the
jury in the course of convicting him under Counts I and II of the
Information.

In the event that the jury had relied upon the

conspiracy variation, which would have been revealed by way of the
special verdict form, the conviction would have been reduced to a
second-degree felony or one classification pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-202(2) (2002).

14

Intent

C,

Instruction

The State argues that Mr. Terry's ineffective

assistance

challenge to the intent instruction fails because the statute
merely

identifies

intent.

factors a jury may consider

in determining

Notwithstanding, the State fails to rebut Mr. Terry's

argument, which is based on established Utah case law, requiring
the jury to be instructed with respect to all the legal elements
that it must find to convict a defendant of the crime so charged.
State v. Jones,
Before

the

823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991).
jury

could

convict

Mr. Terry

of

Clandestine

Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment as set forth in Counts I
and II of the Information, it had to find that the State had
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Terry " [k]nowingly or
intentionally;

. . . [p]ossessed a controlled substance precursor

with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation;
AND/OR

. . . [c]onspired with or aided another to engage in a

clandestine laboratory operation . . . ." (R. 92-94).

Utah Code

Ann. § 58-37d-6 (2002) specifically designates the circumstances
under which the jury, as the trier of fact, may infer that a
defendant
operation.

intended

to

engage

in

a

clandestine

laboratory

That provision states:
The trier of fact may infer that the
defendant intended to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation if the defendant:
15

(1) is in illegal possession of a controlled
substance precursor; or
(2)
illegally
possesses
or
attempts
to
illegally possess a controlled
substance
precursor and is in possession of any one of
the following pieces of equipment:
(a) glass reaction vessel;
(b) separatory funnel;
(c) glass condenser;
(d) analytical balance; or
(e) heating mantle.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6

(2002) .

The failure of trial counsel to object to the proposed jury
instructions as an incomplete and thereby inaccurate statement of
the elements and relevant law fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, which is demonstrated existing
Utah

case

law, Utah

Code Ann.

§ 58-37d-6,

factual circumstances of the case.

and

the

underlying

But for counsel's deficient

performance, the outcome would have been different inasmuch as Mr.
Terry would

not

clandestine

laboratory

particularly

have

been

convicted

precursors

applicable

in

light

of

the

and/or
of

the

enhanced

crime

of

This

is

equipment.
foregoing

ineffective

assistance of counsel and plain error arguments.
The jury must be instructed as to all the legal elements that
it must find to convict a defendant of the crime so charged -- the
absence of which is reversible error.
1059, 1061

(Utah 1991)

(Utah 1980)); see

also

(citing State v.

State

v. Roberts,
16

State
Laine,

v. Jones,

823 P. 2d

618 P.2d

33, 35

111 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah

1985)

(stating that

"[t]he general

rule

is that

an accurate

instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential.") .
The

trial

court

plainly

erred

by

failing

to

completely

and

accurately instruct the jury on the law applicable to the legal
element of intent as it pertained to Counts I and II of the
Information.
This

error

was

obvious

in

light

of

the

trial

court's

obligation to so instruct the jury, which is well-established by
Utah case law and rules concerning a trial court's duty.

The

resulting error was harmful because it precluded the jury from
completely and accurately considering all the elements of the
charges set forth in Count I and II of the Information.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the
previously

filed

Brief

of

Appellant,

Mr.

Terry

respectfully

requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the
case to the trial court for a new trial or, in the alternative,
that this Court reverse Mr. Terry's convictions and enter judgment
for the lesser included offenses together with any relief the

17

Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances of the
case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s

20th day o^March,

2006.

&\WIG<3INS, P . C .

eys
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lggwis
fc^TT^pellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this 21st
day of March, 2 0 06:
Ms. Karen A. Klucznik
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Uf 8^1^-0^54
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ADDENDA
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24 (a) (11) .
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